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Deception in Electronic Goods and Services
 
Neil C. Rowe





Deception is a frequent but underappreciated aspect of human society (Eckman, 2001). Deception in electronic goods and services is
facilitated by the difficulty of verifying details in the limited information available in cyberspace (Mintz, 2002).  Fear of being
deceived (often unjustified) is in fact a major obstacle to wider use of e-commerce and e-government by the public.   One survey
reported consumers thought fraud on the Internet was 12 times more common than offline fraud, and 3 out of 5 people thought their
credit-card number could be stolen in most online transactions (Allen, 2001); both are overestimates.  We assess here the nature of the
deception threat, how deception can be detected, and what can be done about it.
 
This chapter appeared in the Encyclopedia of E-Commerce, E-Government, and Mobile Commerce, M. Khosrow-Pour, ed., Hershey,




Deception is common in many areas of human endeavor (Ford, 1996).  Deception is in fact essential to the normal operation of
business, law, government, and entertainment as a way to manipulate people (Nyberg, 1993).  But there is a complex boundary
between acceptable deception and unacceptable or illegal deception.
 
Deception can occur with either the purveyor (offeror) of goods or services or with the customer (buyer), and it strongly affects trust in
a transaction (Friedman, Kahn, & Howe, 2000).  Some examples in online activities include:
A customer provides a fake credit-card number for a transaction.
A Web site takes a customer's money but never provides a promised good or service.
A Web site solicits a customer's email address for spamming them but claims it is for potential "problems with your order".
A Web site incorrectly says they can legally sell you a drug without a doctor's prescription.
A customer with a grudge posts false health reports about a product on a Web bulletin board.
Usually the motivation for deception in goods and services is financial gain, but other reasons include revenge and self-glorification.
 
Unfortunately, the rather anonymous nature of cyberspace encourages deception.  One problem is that the communications bandwidth,
or amount of information that can be transmitted between people, is considerably less than in face-to-face human interactions, even
with videocameras.  Studies indicate that people are more deceptive the smaller the bandwidth (Burgoon et al, 2003); for instance,
people are more deceptive on the telephone than in videoconferencing.  The detection of deception in online interactions is made
difficult by the absence of many useful visual and aural clues; careful studies of consumer behavior have confirmed this difficulty
(Grazioli & Jarvenpaa, 2000).  This raises problems for electronic commerce and government. 
 
Deception methods and countermeasures
 
Categories of deception in electronic goods and services
 
We can distinguish five major categories of deception in online transactions: Puffery or overstated claims, insincerity of promises or
claims, trespassing, masquerading, and fraud (Grazioli & Jarvenpaa, 2003).  Most instances happen with the World Wide Web, with
some occurring in email and other uses of the Internet.
 
Puffery includes most advertising since it rarely accurately summarizes the merits of a product or service.  Deceptive advertising is
encouraged by the nature of online interaction: It is hard for a customer to know with whom they are dealing.  An impressive Web site
is no guarantee of a reliable business, unlike an impressive real-world store or shop.  Furthermore, the customer cannot hold and touch
the merchandise, and the images, audio, or video provided of it are typically limited.  So it is tempting for an online purveyor to make
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unsupportable claims.  Puffery also includes indirect methods such as a Web site for a children's television show that is designed to sell
a particular toy, or people who endorse products in online discussion groups without revealing they work for the purveyor ("shilling").
 
Insincerity has many forms online.  Many Web search engines list pages they have been paid to display but that are not the best
matches to the given keywords.  A purveyor can promise "extras" to a sale they have no intention of delivering, or a customer can
promise large future purchases.  Emotions can also be faked, even love (Cornwell & Lundgren, 2001).  False excuses like "being
busy"  are easy to make on the Internet.  Negative puffery, where a customer or other business says bad things about a product or
service (Floridi, 1996), as for revenge or to manipulate stock prices, are another form of insincerity.  And "Remove me from the
mailing list" links can actually be scams to get your name onto a mailing list.
 
Trespassing is breaking into computer systems to steal its time, memory, or other resources, and is usually by deception.  It is
commonly associated with "hackers", people breaking in for fun, but is increasingly practiced by spyware, and by criminals to obtain
staging sites for attacks on other computers (Chirillo, 2002; Bosworth & Kabay, 2002). 
 
Masquerarding or "identity deception" is pretending to be someone that one is not.  There are many forms online:
Customers can steal passwords or identification numbers, then use them to steal goods and services.
Purveyors can also pretend to be a different entity than they really are.  This is facilitated by the lack of regulation of Web sites
and their claims, and by the ability to give false return addresses in email and false link text on Web sites.
A serious problem of this type is "phishing", inviting or threatening people to induce them to visit a decoy Web site where they
are asked to supply personal data such as credit-card numbers and bank-account numbers for subsequent theft.  An example
enticement is to claim to be the government tax office needing information about a tax return.
Counterfeit Web sites try mimic familiar Web sites to steal from customers.  Classic tricks are names confusable with those of
well-known sites, like "googl.com" instead of "google.com", or numbers in the address instead of letters to prevent recognition.
Both deceptive Web sites and deceptive email can steal professional-looking graphics and fonts from legitimate sites and
email, to look more convincing.
A site may even "hijack" business from another by using the same Internet (IP) address, but this only will work for a short time
before it is discovered and stopped.
Data such as credit-card numbers could possibly be stolen from packets traversing the Internet, but this is becoming very
difficult as many commercial sites now encrypt such sensitive data.
Fake online documents are hard to detect, since most clues to forgeries like handwriting style and provenance are not available,
but style inconsistencies can still help (Kaza, Murthy, & Hu, 2003).
 
The most serious electronic deceptions in goods and services are crimes of fraud (Boni & Kovachich, 1999; Loader & Thomas, 2000). 
(McEvoy, Albro, & McCracken, 2001) and (Fraudwatch, 2005) survey specific popular techniques.  Unscrupulous Web purveyors can
collect money without providing a promised good or service since it is easy to appear and disappear on the Web; fake charities are a
notorious example.  Purveyors may not feel much consumer pressure because it is hard for customers to complain about long-distance
transactions.  The Internet is well suited to many classic scams, notably the many forms of the "Nigerian letter" asking for money in
the promise of receiving much more money in the future.  Electronic voting is a special concern for fraud (Kofler, Krimmer, &
Prosser, 2003).
 
The ethics and legality of deception
 
Online transactions benefit from the trust of the participants.  Deception subverts trust and makes online businesses less efficient
because of the subsequent need to check credentials and promises.  Because of similar costs to society in general, ethical theories
usually claim that most forms of deception are unethical (Bok, 1978), and laws in every society identify some forms of deception as
fraud legally.  American law uses the doctrine of "implied merchantability" to say that a contracted good or service must be provided
adequately or the money must be refunded.  Waivers of responsibility that consumers must approve before proceeding on a Web site
do not have much weight in court because consumers rarely can be said to give informed consent.  But there are many other issues; see
the many Internet-related publications of the U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC, 2005).
 
Detecting deception in goods and services
 
Studies have shown that most people are poor at detecting deception (Ford, 1996).  Thus in cyberspace with its limited bandwidth,
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deception is even more of a problem.  Most training of people (such as law-enforcement personnel) to recognize deception in human
interactions focuses on clues that are absent in cyberspace such as the visual ones of increased pupil dilation, blinking, and self-
grooming, and vocal clues such as higher voice pitch, more frequent speech errors, and hesitation.  However, some traditional clues to
deception do apply to cyberspace (Zhou & Zhang, 2004), including:
Short responses, concealing lack of knowledge;
Increased use of negatives, concealing lack of knowledge;
Overgenerality, concealing lack of knowledge;
Errors in spelling, punctuation, or grammar, indicating lack of knowledge or a deliberate attempt to get past spam filters;
Obvious random selections, indicating program-generated text;
Overly quick responses, indicating preplanned strategies;
Overly slow responses, suggesting ongoing planning;
Increased hyperbole or abusive language, inducing emotional responses as decoys;
Increased irrelevance, offering misdirection.
All these are common in deceptive advertising, as in "Never need a proscription [sic] again with Viocks, the secret of celebrities [sic]
long health!!!!"  Here is a real phishing email with deliberate randomness and both deliberate and accidental spelling and punctuation
errors (and invisible "normal" text as camouflage for spam filters):
From: Pasquale Pham [csjtirhqvmksdt@rr.com]
Sent: Tuesday, November 16, 2004 10:17 AM
To: mrsmorton@nps.edu
Subject: Why are you silent,
Hello,
You can . r e finance your mortga g e . with 4.15 % . ra t e
and reduce your monthly payment at least twice. One minute can






Besides "low-level" clues which reflect the difficulty of the deceiver controlling all their channels of indirect communication,
cognitive clues reflect the difficulty of constructing  and maintaining deceptions (Heuer, 1982; Whaley & Busby, 2002).  Logical
inconsistencies are the most important of these.  The above example shows inconsistency between the email address of the sender,
their name, and the company they claim to represent; inconsistency between the two parts of the sender's name; and inconsistency
between the company, the clickable link text "uxqydujs", and the site the link actually takes you to, www.qolkamdnt.com.  The Web
registry www.whois.sc reports that this site was registered in Baku, Azerbaijan, for only 21 days, so it is unlikely to be a reputable
lender for mortgages in the United States, the country to which it was sent.  In addition, it is logically inconsistent to solicit a mortgage
and also say "Your application is approved."
 
Lack of links from reputable Web sites is another clue that a site is suspicious, and that can be checked with a Web browser.  The
cliché that "If it's too good to be true, it probably isn't" is always helpful.   Techniques derived from crime investigation are helpful for
detecting dangerous deceptions (MacVittie, 2002) including computer forensics (Prosise & Mandia, 2001) and criminal profiling
(Wang, Chen, & Akabashch, 2004).
 
Responding to deception and preventing it
 
Because deception can occur in such a range of online activities, a variety of countermeasures should be considered:
·         Ignoring it: Deceptive businesses and sites should not be patronized, and this is helped if they are not indexed or linked to, based
on critical review.  Ignoring works well against lesser deceptions.
·         Education: Both customers and purveyors can benefit from learning about possible deceptions.  For instance, people should know
not to give their passwords or identification numbers to anyone, no matter what emergency is alleged.  Posting of statements of
"netiquette", or etiquette for the Internet, also can educate customers as to acceptable behavior.
·         Passwords: To reduce identity deception by users, passwords can be required in accessing a resource such as a Web site.
·         Encryption: To maintain data privacy, sensitive data like credit-card numbers should be encrypted in files and in transmission on
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the Internet (Schneier, 2000).  Most Web vendors implement this for transactions.
·         Signatures: To authenticate a message (prove who it came from), an unforgeable electronic signature can be attached to it.  This
encrypts a complicated function of the contents of the message, and can be decrypted by the receiver to prove that the message
came unmodified from the sender.
·         Intrusion detection: Trespassing that breaks through first lines of defense can be recognized by software called intrusion-detection
systems (Proctor, 2001).
·         Third-party escrow: Utilities like PayPal can manage contracts between customers and purveyors as a neutral third-party broker.
·         Protocol design: Deception in electronic commerce can be reduced with good "protocols" (scripts and rules) for interactions.  For
instance, interruption of an online purchase at any time should not allow other users to see private information, and this can be
aided by "cookies" and time limits on responses.
·         Reputation management systems: EBay and a number of Internet businesses have buyers and sellers rate one another.  Observed
deception is affects these ratings which are visible to future buyers and sellers (Yu & Singh, 2003).  While there are ways to
deliberately manipulate ratings, they are difficult.
·         Automated deception detection: Some automated tools assess text for deception (Qin, Burgoon, and Nunamaker, 2004).  Some
tools eliminate advertising in displaying Web pages (Rowe et al, 2002).
·         Manual Web-site assessments: Several organizations rate Web sites (e.g., the U.S. Better Business Bureau's "BBBOnline
Reliability Program").  Adequately-rated sites get a "seal of approval" which they can display on their sites, but such graphics are
easy for a malicious site to copy.  (Pacifici, 2002) offers suggestions for rating sites yourself. 
·         Getting background on a Web site: The sites www.whois.sc and www.betterwhois.com provide information about who registered
a U.S. Web site and where, its description, certification, and "blacklist status".  Similar information is available for most countries;
see www.iana.org/cctld/cctld-whois.htm. 
·         Alerting authorities: Deceptive electronic commerce should be reported to government or consumer agencies.
·         Legal recourse: Particularly bad cases of deception should be handled by the courts.  But jurisdictional conflicts can occur when
the parties are in different countries or administrative areas.
·         Counterattacks and revenge: Not recommended because they are usually illegal, risk escalation, and may attack an innocent target
because of the difficulty of confirming identity in cyberspace.  Counterattacks have been tried in the form of deliberately garbled
files posted to music-sharing utilities (Kushner, 2003).
·         Defensive deception: One can deceive a deceptive user to entrap or monitor them.  For instance, one can post fake credit-card
numbers online and see if trespassers use them.  "Honeypots" (The Honeynet Project, 2004) are fake Internet sites that entrap





The suitability of the Internet and the Web to particular kinds of deception means that this phenomenon will be with us for a long
time.  But a variety of new technology will increasingly provide help in combatting it.  Rating and information services will be
increasingly available for Web sites and other Internet business methods, and operating systems will offer increasingly effective built-
in protection against hidden attacks.  Laws eventually catch up with new technology, so we expect that legal recourses will steadily
improve as precedents are gradually made for cyberspace.  How quickly the customers and purveyors will overcome their fears of
being deceived is another story, however.  It may just take time, much in the way that automobiles were not trusted by the public for a




Deception is always a danger in electronic transactions involving goods and services.  Much of the public is reluctant to buy or
contract online for this reason.  But quite a variety of methods can detect deception and, better yet, prevent it.  Wider use of these
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deception: Conveying or implying false information to other people.
fraud: Criminal deception leading to unjust enrichment of the deceiver.
honeypot: A deceptive computer system that entraps trespassers into revealing their methods.
identity deception: Pretending to be someone or some category of person that one is not.
intrusion-detection system: Software for detecting when suspicious behavior occurs on a computer or network.
netiquette: Informal policies for behavior in a virtual community, analogous to etiquette.
phishing: Inducing people (often by email) to visit a Web site that steals personal information about them.
shilling: Making claims (pro or con) for something without revealing that you have a financial stake in it.
signature, electronic: A code someone supplies electronically that confirms their identity.
social engineering: Using social interactions to deceptively steal information like passwords from people.
 
